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TITLE

Precarious Work and the Fertility Intention-Behavior Link: An Analysis Based on the Swiss Household Panel Data

Research Paper

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A b s t r a c t

The negative effect of economic uncertainty on people's fertility decisions is well documented, yet most studies examine only structural factors, perceived work-related, and economic factors. We aim at extending the research in this field by including the role of precarious work (job insecurity, work control, and individuals' financial situation) on the likelihood of positive fertility intentions. We use longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP 2002-2010) to run a set of multinomial logistic regression models of fertility intentions separately for men and women. We let socio-demographic characteristics mediate the effect of precarious work on fertility intentions in all models. Results indicate a gender-specific effect of work control on fertility intentions.

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1. Introduction

When the "Golden Age" of the postwar boom faded, the debate on precarious work re-emerged (Rodgers and Rodgers 1989). With it, research into the consequences of the economic recession on the decreasing fertility multiplied. A key determinant of low fertility—and a relatively stable one in many European countries (Sobotka et al. 2011)—appears to lie in the relationship between (primarily) women's entry into precarious labor market positions and the persistence of traditional gender roles and care-giving norms (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Rindfuss et al. 2003; McDonald 2000; Charles and Grusky 2004). Relying on the work of Rodgers and Rodgers (1989, p. 3), the present study aims to analyze the effects of work precariousness on fertility. In the literature, job insecurity as non-continuous employment and the related impossibility of making life-long plans, is one important dimension of precariousness, which reduces the realization of fertility plans. A second dimension is work control, which refers to the fact that the less people can control wages, the work organization, and working conditions the more they are precarious. The basic assumption is that a lack of work control decreases people's feeling of certainty and practical manageability of both work and family roles. The third and fourth dimensions are closely related to each other: work protection and low income. These two last dimensions taken together reflect the idea that low income often implies poor social integration and therefore increased economic vulnerability (Paugam 1995; Rodgers and Rodgers 1989).

Previous micro-level studies to understand the role of work precariousness on reproductive decision-making on this topic follow three main traditions: one that provides micro-economic explanations and emphasizes economic rationalities (Kalmijn 2011; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Becker et al. 1960); the second tradition prioritizes the ideational dimension, normative reasoning and attitudes in people's fertility decisions and focuses on mental factors (Spéder and Kapitány 2009; Ajzen 1991), and the third tradition concentrates on work-family conflict from a job-demand-resources perspective (Voydanoff 1988; Begall 2011). Studies applying explicitly or implicitly a micro-economic foundation assume that if household income increases, so does the demand for children (Becker et al. 1960). First, one would expect that people with current and future higher incomes will realize their fertility intentions earlier and that their families will consist of more children (income effect). Second, indirect income effects relate to the costliness and irreversibility of reproductive decisions. The opportunity-cost logic suggests that in societies in which men tend to have higher incomes than women, childbearing will typically result in a reduction in women's paid work as they engage in the major part of unpaid care work (Nakamura and Nakamura 1992). Ignoring the normative aspects for a moment, based on the opportunity-cost assumption, precarious work should affect

women less because they have less "to lose" in terms of income and career options given the still persistent gender inequalities on labor markets. At the same time, men would face higher absolute forgone income if having a child would be equally incompatible with men's and women's lives. However, in most Western advanced societies children contribute to a male accomplished life together with having a career, whereas for women work and family represent conflicting demands (Schmitt 2012).

Going beyond such micro-economic explanations, the second tradition focuses on the role of the ideational dimension on fertility decisions. Substantial work originates from the field of social psychology, where the theory of planned behavior (TPB), i.e., the Fishbein-Ajzen model, has been increasingly used as conceptual framework to study fertility intentions as a better predictor of fertility behavior. In addition to socio-demographic factors which are usually influential on fertility (Westoff and Ryder 1977; Hermalin et al. 1979), the TPB considers subjective factors like beliefs and norms as crucial determinants of fertility intentions. Using a TPB framework, Spéder and Kapitány (2009) propose a fertility intentions typology and detect gender differentials in the effects of socio-demographic factors, values and orientations on the realization, postponement, abandonment, or consistent opposition to childbearing.

The third tradition mostly used to study work-family conflict takes a job-demand-resources perspective. This perspective was used to highlight the specific occupational conditions that either contributed to difficulties (i.e., job demands that conflicted with family life) or to solving problems (i.e. resources that aided work-family balance) (Voydanoff 1988; Bianchi and Milkie 2010). Previous research in this perspective has identified main aspects indicating 'quality jobs' such as those offering flexible schedules and organization of work, a higher degree of autonomy (Perry-Jenkins et al. 2000; Mills and Täht 2011), and higher levels of work control (Begall and Mills 2011).

This study combines the account of work precariousness which includes perceived work-related and economic factors, i.e. job demands and (scarce) resources, as determinants of fertility intentions. We consider three key elements of the aforementioned studies: First, we resort to Rodgers and Rodgers' (1989) concept of precarious work and examine its relationship to Spéder and Kapitány's intentions typology (2009). In particular, we ask to what extent do objective and subjective dimensions of job insecurity, work control, and financial situation affect the likelihood of positive fertility intentions in the short term (within the next 24 months)? Second, we consider to what extent the findings are different by gender, by intentions/behavior types, and what might have caused the observed differences. Third we take a longitudinal perspective to complement Begall and Mills' (2011) cross-sectional approach and we assess to what extent life-course

contingent socio-demographic factors influence the likelihood of positive fertility intentions in the short term.

Specifically, the analyses address two key questions: First, how do different dimensions of precarious work affect individual realizations of fertility intentions? Second, does socio-structural and institutional precariousness and related constraints translate in differential realization of childbearing intentions for men and women? Switzerland stands out in some respect from other European countries. Its low fertility rates are a result of very rapidly established equal opportunity policies facilitating the access to political and professional functions (OFS, 2011; European Commission, 2010) paralleled by still very pronounced traditionalism in gender roles and practices, both in the public and private sphere (Charles and Buchmann 1994; Charles and Grusky 2004; Jiang Hong Li et al. 1998). In other words, the rising presence of gender equality offices in public institutions does not compensate neither for discriminatory practices at the workplace, nor for the substantial non-equal gender division of tasks in couples and households (Bernardi et al., in press). Such cleavage at macro level – as observed by McDonald (2000) – between low levels of equity in private institutions (family) and high levels of formal equity in public institutions is assumed to have major depressing effects on fertility. In order to address these issues, we use the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) data that combine the advantage of relatively rich data on the precariousness dimensions of interest with the possibility to analyze fertility histories.

We will start in the next section with briefly reviewing the main theoretical links between precariousness and fertility behavior. In the subsequent section we discuss the precariousness dimensions derived from works by Rodgers and Rodgers (1989) to examine their effects on fertility intentions and behavior. In each of these subsections we reflect upon precariousness as structurally channelled constraint for men and women. The subsequent sections describe the data and the empirical design, the descriptive findings, and the results from the multivariate models. The final section draws conclusions and discusses further implications for research.

2. Fertility Behavior under Precarious Work Conditions: Micro-theoretical Explanations

The economic theory of fertility (ETF) has considered fertility decisions through the lenses of income effects and opportunity costs for children (Becker 1981; Lesthaege and Surkyn 1988). Sociologists and demographers added to this economic perspective of utility maximization an account of socio-demographic, ideational, and institutional factors. Macro explanations cover the influence of women's participation in the labor force (Ahn and Mira 2002; Rindfuss et al. 2003), family policies (Neyer 2006), ideational change (Lesthaege and Neidert 2006) and their effects on fertility decline and the

postponement of childbearing. More recent studies follow the trend to consider fertility intentions as key determinant for the actual decision to have a(nother) child (Philipov et al. 2006; Billari et al. 2009). In this research strand, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991) offers a useful conceptual framework to analyze how reproductive behavior is determined by various socio-demographic factors (e.g., age, parity, education), attitudes toward the behavior in question [e.g., having a(nother) child], subjective (i.e., internalized) norms about the behavior, and the extent to which the behavior is perceived to be subject to control (Philipov et al. 2006). In particular, if the time interval between the declared and realized intention is small (2-3 years), the discrepancy between the two due to the instability of intentions and factors intervening between the intention formulation and its foreseen realization is small (Schoen et al. 1999).

Common to micro-economic explanations and ideational and intention-based approaches is that they imply calculated, or at least reasoned, decision-making (Nauk 2007). However, it may be questioned whether reproductive behavior results from such calculated or reasoned fertility decisions under any societal conditions, because decisions themselves impose costs and are sometimes impossible (Bourdieu 2005; Granovetter 1985; Beckert 2003; Diaz-Bone 2006). For instance, some optimal outcomes are generated in the social process only and are only optimal in particular moments in life (Hanappi, 2011; Dequech 2011). Applying a dynamic view, we assume that fertility intentions are shaped by people's exposure to and experience of situations and conditions they encounter throughout the life course, i.e., fertility decisions are ideation- and norm-based and embedded within certain gender and life course regimes (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999). This leads us to examine the impact of precarious work from a gender perspective, as breadwinner expectations and gender norms are very much likely to exacerbate gender inequalities and thus generate gender-specific impacts of work precariousness on fertility decisions over the life course.

2.1. A Gender View on Precarious Work and Fertility

The ascent of precarious work since the 1970s has complicated fertility decisions of adult family members. If we are to regard the stable employment relationship of the postwar era supported by the contemporary variant of the nuclear family that emerged with it, then precarious work will substantially contribute to transforming families in post-industrial societies. According to micro-economic theories, precarious work is expected to operate in at least two general directions: on the one hand, precarious work implies low and/or insecure current and future income which hinders individuals in making irreversible and costly decisions to have (another) child; on the other hand, a high degree of precariousness reduces people's options to make successful careers and, in turn, affects their likelihood to opt for having a child. For instance, precarious work can

positively impact the realization of a childbirth due to reduced opportunity costs if precariousness reduces career prospects so that the gains from parenthood become preferable. Since, in traditional contexts, gains from parenthood better compensate for women's lower forgone income and career opportunities, we expect that women in precarious work, who can rely on a partner as primary earner, are more likely to realize childbearing. Consequently, effects of precarious work on fertility differ in the extent to which existing gender inequalities condition the costs and benefits of fertility decisions.

Job insecurity is one fundamental dimension signaling precarious work. There is extensive empirical evidence for variations in fertility due to differences in job insecurity (Blossfeld et al. 2005; Kohler et al. 2002). For instance, Adsera (2005) finds that individual employment uncertainty and country-level unemployment rates are correlated with a substantial postponement of second births in Europe. For single countries, Golsch (2003) finds gender-specific effects of perceived job insecurity on the transition to parenthood in Spain. She could show that for men, unstable jobs and low satisfaction with security are substantial barriers to consolidating the economic basis necessary for parenting. In contrast, job insecurity does not play a role for women except for fixed-term full-timers who are mostly higher-educated women. Examining the effects of job insecurity on the timing of parenthood, Bernardi et al. (2008) find different biographical models and strategies to cope with job insecurity for East and West Germans, which points to a different socialization process for the cohorts born from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. While job security is crucial for West Germans' idea of achievement and a pre-condition for family formation in a sequential pattern, East Germans of these generations handle family formation in a more flexible way, regardless of their job insecurity.

In Switzerland, the perception of job insecurity is paralleled by gender-specific opportunity structures on the labor market, in other words, occupational segregation sorts women into the less-protected tertiary sector jobs (Buchmann and Charles 1995; Deutsch et al. 2005; Ferro Luzzi et al. 1998; Nollert and Pelizzari 2008). Taking a micro-economic approach, and if one regards individual anticipations as a function of the future costs and benefits of childbearing, women who are the ones who enter less-protected jobs would be more troubled with the decision to have a child. Uncertainty about costs and benefits of childbearing – the future responsibility for economically sustaining and raising a child – we hypothesize, would depress realization of fertility intentions.

The perception of work control relates to having little or no autonomy to decide upon working times or arrangements (Begall and Mills 2011; Byron 2005), joint consultation, decision-making, and supervising (Karasek 1979; Knudsen et al. 2011; Provan 1980; Brandl et al. 2008). Begall and Mills (2011) found that women with higher levels of work control are significantly more likely to intend to have a second child. Another control

aspect is occupational prestige, which grants holders of a position certain privileges. It operates as symbolic capital that unfolds its effects by virtue of recognition (Bourdieu et al. 1981). Perceived work control can likewise be mobilized to facilitate self-realization in other life domains such as the family (Friedman and Greenhaus 2000), because autonomy in one's practical work organization and also authority helps people to reconciliate competing demands of work and family. As a consequence, we assume that individuals anticipate their ability to cope with future constraints imposed by childbearing on the basis of their work control. These anticipations are context-dependent and gender-specific. The gender-inegalitarian division of housework and childcare responsibilities as found by Stähli et al. (2009) and Bernardi et al. (in press) is hypothesized to produce two consequences for childbearing decisions: for women who cannot (fully) rely on a breadwinner partner in their household, the lack of work control constrains fertility intentions, because low work control puts them into higher precarious conditions in which they cannot rely on secured income or the very existence of their job in the future. At the same time, high-demanding jobs with high work control (that is responsibility and often high time demands) pose conflicts in conciliating work and family life, which is expected to relate negatively to childbearing intentions. We therefore hypothesize that work control factors show strong gender-specific effects on fertility. Again, differences in these effects between men and women have to be considered in a gender-segregated occupational context so that for women higher work control is associated positively with fertility intentions, while for men very high work control may signal strong career orientation and/or role overload, and thus, negatively relates to the desire to have a child.

Financial factors such as income and satisfaction with income at individual and household level have been shown to predict family formation and fertility (De Jong Gierveld and Liefbroer 1995; Huinink 1993; Robert and Blossfeld 1995). A large body of research emerged out of this perspective (Huinink, 1993; De Jong Gierveld and Liefbroer, 1995; Robert and Blossfeld, 1995; Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999; Gustafsson, 2001; Rondinelli et al., 2006; Kreyenfeld, 2009; Kalmijn, 2011). The empirical literature based on micro-data has addressed the evaluation of the relationship between women's *labor force participation* and fertility. Recent attempts by Santarelli (2011) and Andersson et al. (2009) are based on micro-data for single countries that assess the link between labor force participation, income, and birth rates. Both studies present evidence that opportunity costs (career costs) constrain fertility realization. Yet, they show two different situations. While Santarelli (2011) concentrates on differences in birth rates between women who stay at home versus those in employment, showing that Italian non-working women in single-earner households have higher birth rates than employed women, Andersson et al. (2009) observes in a study on Danish working women that

those with higher wages had higher birth rates and at later ages. They explained the later timing by their intention to stabilize their positions in the labor market before the first birth. Against this background, we hypothesize that fertility decisions depend on the available amount of individual and household income and that low levels of financial resources constrain the realization of fertility intentions. The main idea is that individuals anticipate their inability to compensate for the future financial burden caused by childbearing on the basis of their actually generated income and their household income. The satisfaction with their financial situation serves as an additional proxy for this (in)ability. Thus, we hypothesize that intentions are strongly associated with the gender-specific effects of individual and household income. Lower levels of financial resources decrease the realization of fertility intentions. In a society where gender inequalities prevail, gender-specific effects are expected to be high because many women will still rely on their male partner to provide most of the financial resources necessary to guarantee economic subsistence in case of childbearing.

2.2. Life-course differences in the effects of precarious work

Up to now, our hypotheses on the precariousness factors that facilitate positive fertility intentions did not account for differences in these effects across the life-course.

The typical work career pattern of people with a low level of education includes a steep increase early in their career, followed by a relatively stable pattern later. Age and experience play a major role during the first few years of one's career and become less relevant later. This pattern implies that the consequences (costs) of interrupted work careers are small and stable during the largest portion of childbearing age. The opposite is the case for higher-educated people, who enter the labor market later and whose stabilization is more gradual and strongly related to experience. Income patterns follow the same logic, implying that these jobs have a long-term career track (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999). If early childbearing leads them to partly withdraw from the labor market (part-time or full-time), this would not only decrease their wage but also impede their entering career tracks that are typical of higher-educated people. In addition, early motherhood may be interpreted by employers as meaning that these women are less career-oriented, whereas, once women have proved their career ambition, the actual reduction in work hours becomes less relevant. Overall, earlier motherhood may be more consequential and even a penalty for women's careers than later motherhood. Being a father may be part of the image of an accomplished adult male, and research has shown evidence for the so-called daddy's bonus; i.e., fathers, young or old, generally work and/or earn more when they become fathers (Glauber 2008). Though there are trends in the opposite direction, they are still rather uncommon (Long 2012). Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that the effect of work control and the financial situation on fertility intentions depends on the life-course-related consequences of childbearing: the

effects become less negative with increasing age because the costs for higher-educated people are greater earlier in their careers than in later stages.

3. Data and method

3.1. Data

In analyzing specific effects of precarious work on fertility behavior, we use data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) for the period 2002-2010. This survey combines household data with comprehensive individual information on demographic events, fertility intentions, and employment-related indicators. Since 1999, this representative survey follows, on a yearly basis, households interviewing all household members aged 14 and older. Our empirical investigation is restricted to a subsample. First, we selected individuals aged 19-43 since this is the observed age range in which individuals declare positive fertility intentions in our sample. Second, we restricted the sample to individuals cohabiting with their partner to avoid situations in which the gap between intentions and realizations is to be attributed solely to housing issues (Schoen et al. 1999). Finally, we excluded the long-term unemployed and chose individuals who were active in the labor market in at least one of three consecutive waves. In total, data on 1856 individuals (874 men and 982 women) aged 19 to 43 were used in the multivariate analysis.

3.2. Dependent variable

The dependent variable in the analysis, the categorization of individuals according to their intention to have a child and its change over time, is based on a typology first developed by Spéder and Kapitány (2009) and constructed using three questions available in the SHP since 2002: (1) whether the respondent has the intention to have a child within the next 24 months in wave n, (2) whether the individual had a child during the 24 months between wave n and wave n+2, (3) and whether the individual intends to have a child in wave n+1 and wave n+2 if they did not have a child between wave n and wave n+2. The respondents entered the analysis at the time of the first recorded answer on childbearing intention and were categorized into five groups according to their intention/behavior. The first group consists of individuals who intended to have a child within 24 months and had a child within the given period are classified as "intended parents". Furthermore, respondents who intended to have a child in wave n but did not have a child within 24 months are differentiated according to their intention in wave n+2: those individuals who maintained their positive intention are classified as the "stable yes" group (second group), and those who abandoned their intention are labeled "abandoners" (third group). The next category includes respondents who did not intend to have a child at the first observation: Individuals who changed their intention and

wanted a child in wave n+2 are classified as "postponers" (forth group). Finally, the fifth group is composed of individuals who did not intend to have a child within 24 months in wave n and wave n+2 are labelled the "stable no" group (see Table 1). Respondents reporting unintended births have been excluded from the analysis since we focus on intentional childbearing.[i] Such classifications enable us to understand the reasons for the gap between intentions and realizations and the factors leading to childbearing postponement. Since the main interest is to explore why people who intend to have a child realize, postpone, or abandon their intentions, the constantly opposed group is used as the reference group.

Table 1. Childbearing intention and its realization. Identification of five transitions

Intended to have a child within 2 years in wave n	Had a birth between waves n and n+1	Intended to have a child at wave n+2 (i.e., after 24 months)	Sample size			Category of the dependent variable
			Male	Female	N Total	
Yes	Yes		126	145	271	Intended parents
Yes	No	Yes	93	94	187	Stable YES
Yes	No	No	39	37	76	"Abandoners"
No	No	Yes	53	41	94	"Postponers"
No	No		563	665	1228	Stable NO

3.3. Independent variables

The crucial explanatory variables in our study are the indicators of precarious work. We measure precarious *work* by the three main dimensions identified by Rodgers (Rodgers and Rodgers 1989) and covered by the SHP: job insecurity, work control, and financial situation. *Job insecurity* is expressed by three variables: a) the duration of the work contract captures objective job insecurity, defined as indeterminate contract or a fixed-term contract; b) the perceived risk of unemployment in the next 12 months; and c) the perceived employment instability (stable versus unstable). The indicator of the *work control* is measured by three questions that assess whether an individual (a) takes part in decision-making, (b) participates with his/her opinion on it, (c) has supervisory tasks, d) and enjoys occupational prestige*. This latter is measured by the Treiman's prestige scale, which is based on occupational prestige ratings using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). This scale models a prestige hierarchy whose scores range between 0 (lowest prestige) and 100 (highest prestige), and it is supposedly independent of national and cultural settings. Finally, the third dimension is *financial situation*, which we obtain by a set of indicators: a) household income*, which is the yearly total household income, OECD equalized. Three income categories were computed as percentages of the median income (Hübinger 1996): a

middle category, an inferior income category (up to 60% of the national median income), and superior incomes (above 150% of the median income).

We also control for a series of socio-demographic characteristics such as education, occupational status, parity, satisfaction with living together with the partner, and age. In order to measure each individual's *level of education*, we constructed a categorical variable that takes into account the highest level of education achieved by each individual. It distinguishes between individuals with a low level of education (incomplete compulsory school, compulsory school, elementary vocational training; domestic science course, 1 year school of commerce or a general training school); a middle level of education (apprenticeship, technical or vocational school, full-time vocational school, bachelor/maturity; vocational high school with master certificate, federal certificate), or a high level of education (vocational high school; university, academic high school). Our categorization already accounts for cantonal differences in the educational system. The respondents' *occupational status* was classified into five types of occupation (full-time, part-time, looking for a job, in training, jobless). *Parity,* the number of children already born, was introduced to distinguish first-time parents from other parents since the transition to parenthood is a different kind of decision from those related to family enlargement (Yamaguchi and Ferguson 1995; Dommermuth et al. 2011). Thus, the parity variable has been constructed to measure the effect of the first child and subsequent children separately. We expected that individuals who are *satisfied with living together* with their partner are more likely to declare a childbearing intention. *Age* is the demographic age, and it is expected to have a significant positive association with fertility intentions (Morgan 1981). We introduce a control for the squared measure of age since this effect is also known to reduce as people age.

4. Analytical Strategy and Results

First, we present in the descriptive results the intention-behavior/intention types by age group, education, occupation, parity, and household income. Second, we present the results from the multinomial logistic regression models in which we test the specific effects of precarious work on the realization of fertility intentions. We use multinomial logistic regressions in order to predict the role of different precariousness dimensions on the identified five categories of intention-behavior/intention outcomes (Table 1). Multinomial logistic regression models predict for the specified period of observation (3 consecutive waves for each observed individual), the probability of the events under consideration in terms of intention-behavior/intention (i.e. childbirth or change of

intention) based on the observations of whether or not the event has occurred for that particular person.

We present the descriptive findings regarding childbearing intentions, grouped into the five categories of intention-behavior/intention. Short-term fertility intentions remain relatively stable, and most people in the sample either no longer intend to have a child or successfully realize their childbearing intention. Fewer people continue to intend childbearing, postpone, or abandon their intention. Table 2 shows the intention-behavior/intention types by age group, education, occupation, parity, and household income. Although the general pattern is similar for all five groups, there are noticeable differences. Most people who do not intend to have a child over the observation period of 24 months belong to the older age group and either have already children or do not have children at all. Those who successfully realized their intentions have a high or middle level of education and belong to the middle age group. Most men in this group work full-time, while this is true for only half of the women. In contrast to the parents who realized their intentions, the "stable yes" group mostly does not have a child at the time of observation. The abandoners group is slightly older and includes many part-time working women. The postponers group is composed of relatively older, higher-educated men with full-time contracts who have no children. Women are similar to men but for the fact that they are younger. The descriptive findings show that men and women both have sufficient educational and economic resources for childbearing and childrearing, yet they combine family and work life by developing gendered patterns of labor force participation.

Table 2. Description of the sample used in multinomial logistic regression, men and women aged 19 to 43 (number of participants in each category).

		Intended parents		Stable YES		Abandoners		Postponers		Stable NO	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Age group	19-25	10	12	5	7	2	2	3	9	20	48
	26-35	80	109	58	68	18	22	34	27	144	165
	36-43	36	24	30	19	19	13	16	5	399	452
Level of education	High	40	43	38	27	13	9	21	16	167	103
	Middle	79	92	53	63	24	25	31	20	372	475
	Low	7	10	2	4	2	3	1	5	24	87
Occupation	Full-time	111	60	81	45	34	8	46	16	499	129
	Part-time	8	68	8	39	5	23	3	17	48	402
	Jobless/ training	6	16	4	9	0	5	4	7	15	132
Number of kids	0 kids	61	78	57	65	12	12	36	24	136	157
	1 kids	49	48	27	23	19	16	5	6	66	92
	2 and more kids	16	19	9	6	8	9	12	11	361	416
Household income CHF	Low		21		13		8		8		102
	Middle		204		140		51		72		902
	High		30		23		11		13		153

We employed multinomial logistic regressions to predict the effects of the work precariousness dimensions (in wave n) on the development of fertility intentions between wave n and n+2. This method was already used by Spéder and Kapitány (2009) and previously by Heaton et al. (Heaton et al. 1999) to examine the relationship between the fertility intentions and behavior of childless people. In the first step, the gender-specific effects of our precariousness indicators are presented: job insecurity, work control, and financial situation[ii] on fertility intentions/behavior.[iii] These models are not controlled for the socio-demographic variables to show the main effects of our explanatory variables. The results are presented in column a in Table 3 for women and Table 4 for men.

Table 3: Parameter estimates for women: effects of precariousness not controlled (column a) and controlled (column b) for socio-demographic variables on fertility intention based on multinomial logistic regressions, "stable no" group i.e. negative child intention over 24 months (reference), beta-coefficients

Ref. stable no	Intended parents		Stable yes		Abandoners		Postponers	
WOMEN	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Model 3.1								
Job Insecurity								
Fixed-term contract	0.204	-0.408	0.510	-0.097	-0.073	-0.533	1.197*	0.268
Unemployment risk	-0.291	-0.174	0.172	0.316	0.092	0.207	-0.182	-0.365
Employment stability	0.094	0.239	-0.631	-0.406	-0.163	-0.136	-0.225	0.187
Age		2.334***		2.770***		1.235**		1.334**
Age square		-0.038***		-0.045***		-0.020**		-0.024***
Low education (ref. middle)		-0.984*		-1.034		-0.798		-0.900
High education (ref. middle)		-0.592*		-0.208		-0.416		-1.147**
No children (ref. ≥ 2)		2.259***		3.051***		1.379*		1.225*
1 child (ref. ≥ 2)		2.875***		3.162***		2.737***		1.205+
Model 3.2								
Work Control								
Decision-making	0.307	0.309	0.063	0.046	-0.366	-0.323	-0.187	-0.131
Opinion participation	0.169	-0.066	-0.059	-0.336	-0.046	-0.128	0.085	-0.052
Supervisory tasks	0.316	0.155	0.147	-0.040	0.291	0.237	0.635+	0.632
Occupational prestige	0.022**	0.006	0.027**	0.015	0.003	-0.005	0.014	-0.009
Age		2.344***		2.477***		1.341**		1.283**
Age square		-0.039***		-0.040***		-0.022***		-0.024***
Low education (ref. middle)		-0.537		-0.794		-0.562		-1.041
High education (ref. middle)		-0.383		-0.003		-0.245		-1.413**
No children (ref. ≥ 2)		2.292***		2.944***		1.168*		1.025+
1 child (ref. ≥ 2)		2.830***		2.850***		2.421***		1.402*
Model 3.3								
Financial Situation								
Individual income	0.663***	-0.036	0.677***	-0.293	0.386	0.038	0.749**	0.227
Household income	-0.110	0.540	-0.292	0.090	-0.238	-0.102	-0.640	0.027
Satisfaction with financial situation	0.017	0.143	-0.259	-0.161	-0.557+	-0.453	-0.168	-0.093
Age		2.225***		2.533***		1.151**		1.027**
Age square		-0.037***		-0.041***		-0.019**		-0.020**
Low education (ref. middle)		-0.958+		-1.237*		-0.921		-1.035
High education (ref. middle)		-0.272		-0.350		-0.510		-1.398***
No children (ref. ≥ 2)		1.818***		3.283***		1.037+		0.331
1 child (ref. ≥ 2)		2.834***		3.228***		2.099***		0.400

Note. Model 3.1 a: R^2=.01 (Cox & Snell), .01 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(16) =8.35, $p > .5$. Model 3.2 a R^2=.03 (Cox & Snell), .03 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(16) =24.90, $p < .1$. Model 3.3 a R^2=.06 (Cox & Snell), .07 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(12) =51.68, $p < 0.001$. Model 3.1 b: R^2=.42 (Cox & Snell), .49 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(36) =489.75, $p < .001$. Model 3.2 b: R^2=.42 (Cox & Snell), .47 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(40) =431.76, $p < .001$. Model 3.2 c: R^2=.42 (Cox & Snell), .47 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(36) =460.01, $p < .001$. $+ p \leq .1$;* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$.

Table 4: Parameter estimates for men: effects of precariousness not controlled (column a) and controlled (column b) for socio-demographic variables on fertility intention based on multinomial logistic regressions, "stable no" group i.e. negative child intention over 24 months (reference), beta-coefficients

Ref. stable no	Intended parents		Stable yes		Abandoners		Postponers	
MEN	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Model 4.1								
Job Insecurity								
Fixed-term contract	0.046	-0.558	0.649	0.013	-0.064	-0.367	1.617**	0.973
Unemployment risk	0.375	0.195	-0.154	-0.429	0.164	0.186	1.260*	0.952
Employment stability	-0.577	-0.450	0.255	0.275	0.115	0.133	-0.994	-0.972
Age		1.521***		1.492***		1.661**		1.675***
Age square		-0.025***		-0.023***		-0.026***		-0.026***
Low education (ref. middle)		0.365		-1.318		0.008		-0.909
High education (ref. middle)		-0.109		-0.297		0.615		-0.368
No children (ref. ≥ 2)		1.980***		2.690***		1.268**		1.682***
1 child (ref. ≥ 2)		3.028***		2.823***		2.656***		0.736
Model 4.2								
Work Control								
Decision making	-0.110	0.339	-0.025	0.368	0.703	1.072+	-0.739+	-0.423
Opinion participation	-0.056	-0.120	0.355	0.350	0.285	0.175	-0.314	-0.320
Supervisory tasks	-0.074	0.103	-0.260	-0.036	0.331	0.414	-0.627+	-0.450
Occupational prestige	-0.007	-0.021	0.017+	-0.003	-0.006	-0.012	0.040	0.035*
Age		1.517***		1.318***		1.666**		1.183**
Age square		-0.025***		-0.021***		-0.26**		-0.019**
Low education (ref. middle)		0.241		-1.308		0.919		-0.299
High education (ref. middle)		-0.397		-0.516		-0.032		-0.012
No children (ref. ≥ 2)		1.894***		2.844***		1.350**		1.342**
1 child (ref. ≥ 2)		3.044***		3.102***		2.828***		0.862
Model 4.3								
Financial Situation								
Individual income	-0.585+	0.946*	-0.797*	0.520	0.016	0.829	-1.022	0.181
Household income	0.445	-0.542	1.171**	0.079	0.255	-0.238	0.926*	-0.126
Satisfaction with financial situation	0.387*	0.508	-0.119	-0.014	0.403	0.587+	0.302	0.351
Age		1.306***		1.032**		1.745*		1.356**
Age square		-0.022***		-0.017***		-0.028**		-0.022***
Low education (ref. middle)		0.866		-1.100		0.400		-0.704
High education (ref. middle)		0.059		-0.264		0.007		-0.181
No children (ref. ≥ 2)		2.069***		2.503***		1.195*		1.783***
1 child (ref. ≥ 2)		3.002***		2.872***		2.559***		0.964+

Note. Model 4.1 a: R^2=.02 (Cox & Snell), .02 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(12) =15.98, $p > .5$. Model 4.2 a R^2=.04 (Cox & Snell), .04 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(12) =27.79, $p < .05$. Model 4.3 a R^2=.03 (Cox & Snell), .03 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(12) =22.32, $p < 0.5$. Model 4.1 b. R^2=.36 (Cox & Snell), .40 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(36) =368.35, $p < .001$. Model 4.2 b. R^2=.37 (Cox & Snell), .41 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(40) =322.73, $p < .001$. Model 4.3 b. R^2=.35 (Cox & Snell), .39 (Nagelkerke). Model X^2(36) =336.50, $p < .001$. $+ p \leq .1$; $* p \leq .05$; $** p \leq .01$; $*** p \leq .001$.

Job insecurity. The results for model 3.1a for women and 4.1a for men partially confirm our hypothesis that job insecurity impacts fertility intentions. When men and women have a fixed-term contract in wave n, this makes them more likely to postpone their intentions instead of renouncing the idea of having a child in wave n+2. Contrary to our hypotheses, perceived insecurities and risk have no predictive power in this model.

Work control. In models 3.2a for women and 4.2a for men, the results for work control confirm our hypothesis. Men with higher occupational prestige tend to postpone their intentions; i.e., once they have achieved occupational prestige, they intend to have a child. Quite interestingly, for women, occupational prestige predicts a higher likelihood to intend to have a(nother) child or to actually have one, while the actual functional tasks performed are less relevant. Women who have supervisory tasks postpone childbearing more often. Women, regardless of their decision-making power, struggle with similar work family trade-offs as other women, so we find no effect of this variable.

The fact that the effects of supervisory tasks for men and women are diverse in these models may reflect a certain composition of the postponers group with respect to the reference group in terms of age, parity, and education, implying that supervisory tasks and decision authority are related to experience and seniority principles.

Financial situation. If the assumption is correct that having sufficient financial resources provides the economic basis to face constraints imposed by childbearing, then the multinomial coefficients in models 3.3a and 4.3a should positively relate to fertility intentions/behavior. However, the predictions give a different impression. While for women, higher individual income predicts a higher likelihood to intend to have a(nother) child, the effects of income for men are negatively related to childbearing intentions. Men with higher income levels seem to be more likely to no longer have childbearing intentions. In contrast, household income has predictive power for male positive fertility intentions – irrespective of changes in the intentions. These results – not controlling for parity 0 and 1 and more – show all its ambiguity. If the models identified men who have reached their desired number of children and which are those who generally earn more, as we argued in the theory section, they confound cause and effect; i.e., these men earn more because they had children.

Therefore, the subsequent analysis shows how robust these findings are when controlling for socio-demographic variables. The hypothesis is that most indicators are strongly related to age, age square, parity, and socio-economic position (expressed here by education level), which reduce work-related effects. If the analysis reveals gender differences after introducing the control variables, such variation is an indication that life-courses are structured differently between genders.

Gendered life-course structures. Tables 3 and 4 present the results of each of the three dimensions of job precariousness separately and after controlling for socio-demographic

variables in each case (see column b in both tables). The demographic factors of age, parity, and education have high predictive power for positive fertility intentions among both men and women, but they do not always work in the same direction. Model 3.1b addresses job insecurity for women; model 4.1b presents the effects of job insecurity for men. All the effects of these variables disappear when socio-demographic characteristics are taken into account. However, only women seem to be substantively affected by education – intending a child more often if they belong to the middle-educated group – and parity – intending to have a child more often if they have none or only one.

Model 3.2b shows that effects of education and work control must be related since education also becomes irrelevant for women in this case. Instead, parity plays the same role for men, who intend to have a child more often if they have none or only one, once we introduce work control. Models 3.3b and 4.3b address the financial situation. In this case, the individual income of men has a positive effect on having a(nother) child once controls for age parity and education are imposed. For this reversal of the effect, i.e. among the intended parents group and the postponers, we do not have a conclusive explanation but assume that it may imply the role of job experience for income. Another explanation is the effect of having a child already, in other words no matter how young or old men are, they work and/or earn more once they get a child (see e.g. Glauber 2008 for the US; Dermott 2008). Since we do not observe similar effects for women as can be seen from model 3.3b we assume that no such bonus exists for them. In popular writings such phenomenon is often referred to as the "daddy" or "fatherhood bonus" versus the "motherhood penalty" (Long 2012).

This suggests two mechanisms: first, the age variables capture most of the dynamics in childbearing intentions for men and women. Second, a few work-related effects such as those of prestige, work control, and income indicate gender-specificity: it would seem that, after being well-integrated at work and having achieved a certain career, men realize their childbearing intentions irrespective of age. This is clearly not the case for women. One could deduce that women who make it into prestigious positions in a gender-segregated labour market like the one in Switzerland are not family-oriented. In their case, fertility intentions are not significantly influenced by our work precariousness indicators after controlling for socio-demographic factors. This would indicate that women have heterogeneous work and lifestyle preferences and priorities vis-à-vis the articulation of family and employment (Hakim, 2003).

5. Summary and Conclusions

The main contribution of this article is to disentangle effects of key work precariousness dimensions on the realization of fertility intentions. We extend the empirical evidence of the role of work precariousness on family formation dynamics (Begall and Mills 2011; Özcan et al. 2010; Mayer and Carroll 1987; De Jong Gierveld and Liefbroer 1995; Spéder and Kapitány 2009; Schmitt 2012), by considering both objective and subjective dimension of work precariousness in a longitudinal study. To the best of our knowledge no previous study adopted such a comprehensive view. We focus on the effects of job security, work control, occupational prestige, and financial resources to better understand the determinants of reproductive decisions. Using longitudinal data from the SHP, we show that, overall, work precariousness reduces the realization of fertility intentions for men and women. Findings indicate that fertility behavior is shaped by gendered life-course structures based on age, education, income, and work control. Looking at the impact of precarious work and age, our analysis shows that, in the Swiss context, precarious work is particularly restricted to labor market newcomers. Among these, precariousness takes the form of fixed-term contracts and the perceived risk to become unemployed. This particular concentration of precarious work among young workers provides empirical evidence of the institutionally regulated transition from education system to labor market. Similar to Liefbroer et al. (1999), we find that educational attainment has a strong negative effect on women's while this is not the case for men's fertility realization. This may lead to fertility postponement in this relatively young group of women, and if education periods are long, women may not reach their intended family size. At macro-level, low levels of fertility may thereby be re-enforced.

As concerns income, our results show that higher income does not predict women's fertility realization in Switzerland. These results contrast those by Andersson et al. (2000) who find a positive relationship between realizing one's desire to have a child and higher wages among Danish women. If we regarded higher wages as signal for professional integration, (cf. Andersson et al. 2000), it means that stabilization on the labor market preceding childbearing is not fundamental for women's fertility behavior in Switzerland. On the contrary, men with higher wages are more likely to have a(nother) child which confirms persisting traditional gender roles in the family and at work in the Swiss context (Levy et al. 2006; Charles and Grusky 2004). The male breadwinner capabilities are also necessary because many women follow a part-time schedule (Anxo et al. 2007) and are therefore economically dependent on a male earner. In addition, female part-time work can also imply more precarious labor market careers that cannot guarantee economic subsistence.

The extent to which specific gender effects of precarious work shape individual behavior is also shown by one aspect of work control, occupational prestige. Among men,

occupational prestige has consequences on the intention to have a(nother) child. This is because having a child adds up in terms of prestige; i.e., taking the role of the traditional breadwinner contributes to an accomplished adult life for men. In contrast to Begall and Mills (2011) we do find only very weak support for similar effects among women. This implies that women are either more heterogeneous in terms of lifestyle preferences and priorities or that it is mainly up to them to shoulder the burden of re-conciliating work and family life. Additionally, occupational prestige does not compensate for the costs of work-family reconciliation. Concerning financial resources we find that it is mostly men's income that contributes positively to the realization of fertility intentions, which may signal men's breadwinner capabilities. Importantly, Switzerland is characterized by a substantial cleavage between institutional arrangements in market-oriented, hence individualistic, and family-oriented institutions (McDonald, 2000). On the one hand, traditional gender roles and caregiver norms are still deeply culturally embedded and institutionally reproduced by an insufficient provision of public childcare and maternity protection as well as an in-egalitarian role division within couples. One the other hand, Switzerland has increasingly promoted professional aspirations and economic independence of women in the last decades. At the same time the limited employment protection and the rising uncertainty of men's careers makes it necessary for some women in Switzerland to establish themselves economically on the labor market. Such "female breadwinner function" conflicts with family demands and childcare responsibilities as it is indicated by the negative coefficients of individual and the positive effect of household income.

In interpreting these findings, some words of caution are appropriate: First, among the surveyed population in Switzerland only a few people would eventually be identified precarious, because work precariousness is a latent phenomenon hidden in the structures of the economy as a whole. In the Swiss context, work precariousness can even concern people in permanent contracts. Permanent contracts as opposed to fixed-term contracts do not protect better from precariousness since Swiss employment protection legislation is very low, rendering employees in permanent contracts relatively vulnerable to dismissal or layoff (OECD 2011). This is particularly the case for solo mothers/fathers who cannot rely on a partner for economic sustenance. We think it is, therefore, valuable if future research examines the relatively small group of solo mothers/fathers in Switzerland to explore their available resources to face adverse financial and working conditions.

A strength of this study was to go beyond previous research that underlined the role of the economic recession in shaping fertility decision-making across Europe, and to empirically show whether work precariousness has become indeed more pervasive and reaches into the larger core of society—in particular whether this is true for a wealthy

and low-unemployment context such as Switzerland. Contrary to our expectation, only few results of the suggested precariousness dimensions predicted positive fertility intention/realization, whilst strong effects of socio-demographic factors mediating precariousness suggested that gendered life-course structures substantially mold individual behavior.

In conclusion, it appears that precarious workplaces, employment relationships, and subjective experiences of employment are clearly associated with people's life courses and play a crucial role in creating uncertainty about the future, eventually decreasing intentions realization. The disposal of job resources can only partly mitigate these effects. This has a wide range of consequences for people's lives outside the workplace such as constraining individual decision-making on timing and number of children to have, affecting the wellbeing of households and families, and depriving trust and engagement in communities in the wider sense. With this study we hope to have provided some insights into the multiple mechanisms and impacts of work precariousness that challenge the individual ability to combine and realize the roles of the work and family life.

Notes

[i] Due to the survey design of the SHP, we are unable to differentiate between individuals who know that they are infertile and those who do not know.

[ii] In our multinomial logistic regression models, the financial situation is measured by the logarithm of the individual and household income in addition to the satisfaction with the financial situation whose scores range between 0 (lowest satisfaction) and 10 (highest satisfaction).

[iii] The computed association tests for our precariousness variables showed low to medium associations, therefore we did not meet issues of multicollinearity in our models (Cramer's statistics and Pearson correlations; not reported in the paper).

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